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The flight from history: 
from H G Wells to Doctor Who – and back again 
Alec Charles 
Monsters have ceased to be news. There is 
never any shortage of horrible creatures who 
prey on human beings … but examples of wise 
social planning are not so easy to find. 
– Thomas More.1
You spend all your time thinking about dying – 
like you’re going to be killed by eggs or beef or 
global warming or asteroids. But you never take 
time to imagine the impossible. That maybe you 
survive.  
– Doctor Who.2
This paper examines how, in the wake of 9/11, BBC Televisions Doc-
tor Who has symbolically explored that catastrophe and the efforts to con-
struct a new world order in its aftermath. In doing so, it witnesses parallels 
with the apocalyptic and utopian visions of the programmes own greatest 
literary influence, the seminal science fiction of H G Wells. 
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It’s not the end of the world 
Political situations have often advertently paralleled and exploited 
those of fantasy space. Both John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan recog-
nised the power of science fiction concepts (from NASA to SDI) as rally-
ing cries during the Cold War  just as the Soviet authorities launched 
Tarkovskys Solaris (1972) as their response to Kubricks 2001 (1968) in a 
celluloid version of the space race. Hollywood imagineers feature today on 
the payroll of the Pentagon as creative professionals hired to envisage 
worst-case terror scenarios, and even Osama Bin Laden (known to be a 
fan of popular American culture)3 appears to have raided U.S. blockbusters 
for his ideas  he specifically seems to have been inspired in his apocalyp-
tic plotting by Tom Clancys Debt of Honour,4 a story in which a terrorist 
crashes a civilian airliner into Washington.  
Slavoj iek has written of the events of 9/11 as cinematic in their 
spectacular nature5 and Bin Ladens particular debt to Clancy was ac-
knowledged by CNN when, on 11 September 2001, the news station chose 
to interview the novelist as part of its coverage of the attacks on the World 
Trade Center. As Michael Gove wrote in The Times on 12 September 
2001: the scenario of a Tom Clancy thriller or Spielberg blockbuster was 
now unfolding live on the worlds television screens.6 Indeed, the relation-
ship between screen fantasy and the events of 9/11 was underlined, in the 
most extraordinary way, by the debut episode of Chris Carters X-Files 
spin-off, The Lone Gunmen, which in March 2001 had depicted a terrorist 
attempt to fly a hijacked airliner into the World Trade Center. 
Just as history echoes science fiction, there has been a similarly 
strong reciprocal trend for science fiction to reflect contemporary historical 
situations. As far back as H G Wellss The War of the Worlds (1898), we 
have witnessed science fictions expressions of urgent geopolitical angst  
in this case, concerns over the sustainability of imperial hegemony: The 
Tasmanians  were entirely swept out of existence in a war of extermina-
tion waged by European immigrants  Are we such apostles of mercy as 
to complain if the Martians warred in the same spirit?7
Orson Welless 1938 radio adaptation of The War of the Worlds fa-
mously revisited Wellss narrative to play upon contemporary anxieties 
about the imminence of world war, while Byron Haskins 1953 screen ver-
sion saw Los Angeles devastated in an enactment of prevalent fears of So-
viet invasion and nuclear holocaust. Half a century on, with its ravaged cit-
ies, crashed jets and underground alien terror cells, Steven Spielbergs 
War of the Worlds (2005) has updated Haskins Cold War allegory as a fa-
ble of the War on Terror. 
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The scope of Spielbergs adaptation recalls Wellss insight that this 
isnt a war  It was never a war, any more than theres a war between men 
and ants.8 This is of course the reality of contemporary conflict. The cur-
rent situation is one in which, as Howard Tumber and Frank Webster sug-
gest, militarily the USA is beyond challenge.9 This sense of disequilibrium 
has been palpable since the collapse of the Soviet superpower in the early 
1990s  and indeed since the first Gulf War (1990-91), a conflict which, ac-
cording to Jean Baudrillard, was won in advance  We will never know 
what an American taking part with a chance of being beaten would have 
been like.10 More recently, Aijaz Ahmads depiction of the War on Terror 
has advanced uncanny echoes of Wellss interplanetary war: Such is the 
asymmetry of power in our time: those who rule the universe shall be victo-
rious against  the most wretched of the earth.11
Spielbergs humans start off as the victims of a surprise terror attack 
(like the people of New York in September 2001), but they end up as casu-
alties of an invasion by forces whose technological superiority mirrors the 
overwhelming military imbalance, which characterises the War on Terror  
and thus come to resemble the citizens (and insurgents) of Iraq. What goes 
around comes around: the imperial power becomes politically equivalent to 
its former Tasmanian subject. Indeed, when in Wellss original novel a 
shell-shocked artilleryman envisages a mode of underground guerrilla war-
fare against the alien invaders, the scenario closely anticipates by more 
than a century the resistance in occupied Iraq.12
Spielbergs film is one of several recent blockbusters that present the 
al-Qaeda attacks and the War on Terror as the defining topics of twenty-
first century screen science fiction. Like The Day After Tomorrow (2004), I 
Am Legend (2007) and Cloverfield (2008), Spielbergs War of the Worlds 
depicts the destruction of the postmodern American metropolis. Cloverfield 
is particularly striking for the way in which its visual style (exclusively per-
formed through the lens of a hand-held camcorder) recalls the shaky news 
footage of 11 September 2001.  
Other films focus on the reactionary transformation of American soci-
ety since 9/11. Set in Washington DC, Oliver Hirschbiegels The Invasion 
(2007) revises the anti-Communist politics of Don Siegels Invasion of the 
Body Snatchers (1956) to imagine western pluralism transformed into a 
fundamentalist Utopia by forces which are at once alien and insidious: a 
world in which the violence of Iraq and Darfur are unknown  in which 
there is no other  and in which therefore humans cease to be human.  
Even Spielbergs Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal Skull 
(2008) draws timely parallels between McCarthyism and contemporary 
American paranoia. Chris Carters The X-Files: I Want to Believe (2008) 
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makes a related point when it self-consciously juxtaposes images of 
George W Bush and J Edgar Hoover, while James McTeigues V for Ven-
detta (2006) envisages the Orwellian tyranny of a post-War-on-Terror Brit-
ain. 
Recent superhero movies have also examined Americas continuing 
moral crisis, most obviously the unambiguous depiction of the arms indus-
trys exploitation of the War on Terror in Jon Favreaus Iron Man (2008). 
Heralded by a poster displaying a burning city skyscraper, Christopher 
Nolans The Dark Knight (2008) advances a similarly problematic perspec-
tive upon the crusade against an uncompromising and irrational terrorism in 
its representation of the twilit Utopia of the vigilante  a state of emergency 
in which civil rights are suspended and one which, the film finally empha-
sises, must not be allowed to solidify into a new world order. Meanwhile, 
the opening of another comic-book adaptation, Tim Storys Rise of the Sil-
ver Surfer (2007), sees an alien strike cause an aircraft to crash into a 
Manhattan skyscraper. The film goes on to critique extreme rendition: the 
torture of a terror suspect by U.S. agents at an isolated military base. 
These films invoke apocalyptic concerns that have lain dormant since 
the end of the Cold War. Similar anxieties are discernible in the CBS televi-
sion series Jericho (2006-08) and the BBCs Spooks: Code 9 (2008), both 
set in the wake of nuclear terror attacks. Analogous end-of-civilization sce-
narios are witnessed in Danny Boyles 28 Days Later (2002) and Juan Car-
los Fresnadillos 28 Weeks Later (2007)  the latter elaborating to address 
issues of U.S. military brutality in the failed reconstruction of an occupied 
zone, the consequent spread of rabid extremism and the eventual exporta-
tion of terror. These visions refer us back to the eschatological science fic-
tion of the opening years of the Cold War: Richard Mathesons 1954 novel I 
Am Legend13 (which inspired film adaptations in 1964, 1971 and 2007) and 
John Wyndhams 1951 novel The Day of the Triffids (inspired by The War 
of The Worlds14 and adapted for cinema in 1962, and for television in 1981 
and 2009). They also recall the BBCs Survivors (1975-77), another ac-
count of a post-apocalyptic world and remade in 2008 for a post-9/11 gen-
eration. 
These fantastically cataclysmic tableaux are somewhat more optimis-
tic than, say, the harsh realism of Nicholas Meyers The Day After (1983) or 
Mick Jacksons Threads (1984). Like the Christian apocalypse itself, they 
delineate a purged world ripe for reconstruction: they represent, in Fredric 
Jamesons words, a Utopian wish fulfilment wrapped in dystopian wolfs 
clothing.15 One recalls in this context ieks analysis of two of screen fic-
tions most celebrated responses to 9/11, Paul Greengrasss United 93 
(2006) and Oliver Stones World Trade Center (2006): they want to read 
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the 9/11 catastrophe as a blessing in disguise ... This utopian perspective 
is one of the undercurrents that sustain our fascination with disaster mov-
ies: it is as if our societies need a major catastrophe in order to resuscitate 
the spirit of community solidarity.16 Jameson and ieks interpretations 
expose a post-catastrophic utopianism which we might also observe in 
Tony Blairs declaration to a Labour Party conference on 2 October 2001: 
The kaleidoscope has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will 
settle again. Before they do, let us re-order this world around us. 
Blairs geopolitical opportunism anticipates the denouement of the Hol-
lywood adaptation of Douglas Adamss The Hitch Hiker’s Guide to the Gal-
axy (2005), which flourishes a utopian Earth built to replace the planet 
obliterated by the Vogon demolition fleet. This cathartic reconstructionism 
adheres to H G Wellss argument in The Shape of Things to Come (1933), 
that:  
without the sufferings of these generations mens minds could never 
have been sufficiently purged of their obstinate loyalties, jealousies, 
fears and superstitions; mens wills never roused to the efforts, dis-
ciplines and sacrifices that were demanded for the establishment of 
the Modern State.17  
Wellss Modern State is founded upon a century of war and plague, which 
annihilates half the human race.18 However, his totalitarian visionaries, like 
those neoconservatives bent upon building a new world order in the wake 
of 9/11, might do well to remember the eventual despair of Lionel Verney, 
the sole survivor of a world also ravaged by war and plague, an idealist 
who finally comes to recognise the futility of his own utopian ambitions, in 
Mary Shelleys seminal work of apocalyptic science fiction, The Last Man: I 
smile bitterly at the delusion I have so long nourished.19
Much of the popular television fantasy and science fiction broadcast in 
the United States since 9/11 advances similarly problematic perspectives 
upon the imposition of a new world order. Star Trek: Enterprise (2001-
2005), Battlestar Galactica (2003-2009) and Heroes (2006- ) each in their 
different ways scrutinise human responses to sudden and devastating ter-
ror attacks upon the modern democratic metropolis.20 Commensurate con-
cerns can also be witnessed in BBC Televisions twenty-first century rein-
vention of its longest running science fiction series, Doctor Who. 
Doctoring history 
The BBCs own history of British science fiction, The Martians and Us 
(2006), has argued that the original series of Doctor Who (1963-89) began 
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as an elaboration of H G Wellss The Time Machine.21 John Tulloch and 
Henry Jenkins similarly report that the time-travelling idea for Doctor Who 
originated in Wells;22 and Tulloch and Manuel Alvarado add that:  
When in November 1963 the scientific but whimsical Doctor returned 
to his time machine for the first time, dressed as a turn-of-the-
century gentleman, the salute to H G Wells scientist/time traveller  
was appropriate  Doctor Who, as its first producer said, was based 
more than loosely on The Time Machine.23  
Indeed, the Doctors first encounter with his arch-enemies, the Daleks, in 
1963 (the tale of a post-apocalyptic conflict between effete pacifists and the 
subterranean monsters who prey on them) is very obviously modelled on 
The Time Machine  and perhaps more immediately on George Pals 1960 
screen adaptation of Wellss novel.24
Upon the franchises extraordinarily successful revival in 2005, the 
new Doctor Who seemed significantly less Wellsian in its accents and tone. 
It was self-consciously contemporary, set in a land of leather jackets, hous-
ing estates and New Labour politics, and overtly resolved upon getting the 
tone right for the twenty-first century.25 It has discussed illusory weapons 
of mass destruction in World War Three (2005), American hegemony in 
The Christmas Invasion (2005), The Sound of Drums (2007) and Voy-
age of the Damned (2007), and Guantanamo Bay in The Sontaran 
Stratagem (2008). Its lead writer, Russell T Davies, has proclaimed the 
programmes anti-war message26 and has added that, although these at-
tempts at quick satire may be hardly profound, he believes that, for ex-
ample, his reference to the weapons of mass destruction debate satirises 
a politician on TV about needing a war; men have died for that, are dying 
now.27 The programmes parodies of British politics have even been noted 
by the Daily Telegraph, among other newspapers, which recognised the 
similarity between Tony Blair and the shows arch-villain, the Master, who, 
in The Sound of Drums (2007), fools the British people into electing him 
Prime Minister.28
Digitally remastered 
By the start of the new series of Doctor Who, the protagonists home 
planet has been annihilated in a final battle with the Daleks  the Time War. 
In an approach reminiscent of the blackout which accompanies footage of 
the attack on the World Trade Center at the opening of Michael Moores 
Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004), this catastrophe is never shown, as though its vis-
ual and emotional impact were too much for the eyes or for the screen. 
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In the programmes second episode, the Earth is also destroyed (in 
the far distant future), and in its second and third seasons the series de-
picts a reconstructed New Earth, and specifically (and aptly) the city of New 
New York. However, this New Earth is not the Utopia it appears (fleetingly) 
to be. On his first visit to New New York, the Doctor discovers a society 
whose health is sustained by the torture of an imprisoned underclass in a 
vivisectionists version of Abu Ghraib; on his second visit, he finds the city 
ravaged by drug addiction and environmental pollution. Humanitys brave 
new world is a very poor sort of Utopia, a state of moral complacency and 
social decadence, a veritable entropia. 
In The Ark in Space (1974), Tom Bakers Doctor had discovered the 
final survivors of humanity sheltering in a space station from solar flares, 
which had devastated the Earth. Baker declared: 
Homo sapiens: what an inventive, invincible species. Its only a few 
million years since they crawled up out of the mud and learned to 
walk. Puny, defenceless bipeds. Theyve survived flood, famine and 
plague  theyve survived cosmic wars and holocausts and now here 
they are, out among the stars, waiting to begin a new life, ready to 
outsit eternity. Theyre indomitable. Indomitable. 
Thirty-three years later, in an episode entitled Utopia (2007), David Ten-
nants Doctor encounters a similar group of human survivors  this time at 
the very end of the universe. Tennants words echo Bakers speech:  
You survived. You might have spent a million years evolving into 
clouds of gas and another million as downloads, but you always re-
vert to the basic human shape  the fundamental humans. The end 
of the universe and here you are  indomitable, thats the word  in-
domitable. 
Yet this optimistic view of humanitys potentially utopian future is short-
lived. In The Christmas Invasion (2005), when Britains Prime Minister or-
ders the destruction of a defeated alien invasion force, the Doctors judg-
ment of homo sapiens is significantly less positive: That was murder  I 
should have told them to run as fast as they can. Run and hide because 
the monsters are coming. The human race. In Midnight (2008), the para-
noia which envelops a hijacked travelcraft does not evoke the heroism of 
the passengers of United 93 (or, for that matter, of the ferry passengers in 
The Dark Knight) so much as the xenophobic hysteria of the UKs tabloid 
press, as the travelcrafts passengers, faced with an unseen threat, con-
spire to cast the programmes alien hero to his death: He just turned up 
out of the blue  like an immigrant  he hasnt even told us his name 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we should throw him out  get rid of him now. The following episode, 
Turn Left (2008), presents a dystopian alterity in which London has been 
destroyed by an alien strike  in a curious version of 9/11, a space liner has 
crashed into Buckingham Palace. The resulting state of emergency wit-
nesses the triumph of a military authoritarianism, which leads inexorably 
towards the establishment of detention (or concentration) camps for immi-
grants: Labour camps  thats what they called them last time. Its happen-
ing again. The crisis results in a resurgence of racist nationalism: Its the 
new law. England for the English. 
In the first season of the regenerated Doctor Who, the humans of the 
two-hundredth millennium are enthralled to relentless rounds of reality tele-
vision and game shows, while the losers from these programmes are har-
vested to breed new generations of robotic killers. The second season pre-
sents a vision of contemporary humanity enslaved to its mobile information 
and communications technologies, which ultimately convert (or upgrade) 
the species into another breed of killer robots. The third season depicts or-
dinary men, women and children at the end of the universe so desperate to 
survive the impending cataclysm that they download into cybernetic globes, 
which then return in time to devastate and occupy early twenty-first century 
Earth. This is, as the series terms it, our ultimate Utopia. 
The latter apocalypse is deployed by the Doctors fellow Time Lord, a 
psychopathic villain known as the Master: he transforms present-day Earth 
into a slave empire controlled by murderous robot globes, which contain 
those remnants of the human race. The Master attempts to appropriate the 
protagonists role as the saviour of humankind, but his vision is technocratic 
and puritanical and his Utopia is a barren dystopia, a war-torn landscape 
reminiscent of other contemporary attempts to construct a new world order. 
The new series of Doctor Who constantly warns against the dangers of 
these philanthropic fundamentalists  from the Emperor of the Daleks, bent 
on building his own heaven on earth in The Parting of the Ways (2005), 
to John Lumic and Davros, the fanatically utopianist creators of the robotic 
Cybermen and the Daleks respectively. 
Extreme renditions 
This ostensibly benevolent tendency towards moral extremism repre-
sents the central problem of global politics today. Do we remain uncom-
promisingly faithful to our utopian ideals, or do we attempt to negotiate a 
pragmatic reconciliation with material history, a consensus mobilised to 
confront the current historical crisis, this clash of civilizations manifest in an 
absurd and endless conflict against an abstract concept? Caught between 
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idealism and pragmatism, we may recall Derridas elaboration of this di-
chotomy:  
Tragedy would leave this strange sense, a contingent one finally, 
that we must affirm and learn to love instead of dreaming of the in-
numerable  But where would the dream of the innumerable come 
from if it is indeed a dream? Does not the dream itself prove that 
what is dreamt of must be there in order for it to provide the 
dream?29  
Is it the case that anti-utopian sensibilities themselves, as Fredric Jameson 
proposes, admit some conviction as to the inevitability of Utopia?30 Or is 
Utopia, as Jameson also implies, practically impossible  insofar as so 
radically different a society cannot even be imagined?31
William Morris would not of course admit to the unreality of his utopian 
ambition: if others can see it as I have seen it, then it may be called a vi-
sion rather than a dream.32 Edward Bellamy also refused to concede to 
contemporary reality. Towards the end of Looking Backward, his narrator 
wakes from his dream of a twentieth century Utopia and finds himself once 
more in the dystopian Boston of the nineteenth century. Yet a few pages 
later, he is roused from that nightmare to discover that his return to the 
nineteenth century had been the dream, and [his] presence in the twentieth 
was the reality.33
Faced, however, with the immensity and immediacy of humanitys ca-
pacity for self-destruction, Derrida, by contrast, eventually rejects an im-
possibly utopian idealism in favour of a rather more practicable approach. 
He suggests that the most exigent task of philosophy is to postpone the 
uses of these weapons [of mass destruction]  To make the conversation 
last.34 Derrida sides with the pragmatics of affirmation: deconstruction is 
always  on the side of the affirmation of life.35 From this position, he ar-
gues that one must keep the discussion going and that we might thereby 
band together against both the politics of American hegemony  and an 
Arab-Islamic theocratism.36
Derrida declares that we must urgently now learn to live.37 Yet, as he 
adds, this imperative is not unproblematic. Who is it that teaches us to live, 
who conjures and commands this existential Utopia? And where therefore 
might this utopian desire tend? The irony is that in learning to live, we are 
all too often directed by the very extremist influences, which this strategy of 
pragmatic affirmation has renounced. In the competing voices which now 
seek to prescribe our ways of life, Derrida thus discerns conflicts of culture 
and religion that are tearing apart  the world  Entire regiments of 
ghosts have returned  camouflaged by  the postmodern excess of 
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arms (information technology  and so forth).38
These armoured techno-utopianists have found form in so many of 
science fictions prophecies, particularly in Doctor Whos own Army of 
Ghosts (as it dubbed its legions of Cybermen in 2006) and the rest of its 
robotic and monstrous host. But the villains of the twenty-first centurys 
Doctor Who are not necessarily malevolent in themselves: they are impa-
tient extremists who refuse to compromise their quests for perfection. Per-
haps the most striking of these figures is Davros, the creator of the Daleks, 
who in Journeys End (2008) attempts to obliterate the universe in order 
to attain his vision of heaven:  
Structure falls apart  People and planets and stars will become 
dust, and the dust will become atoms, and the atoms will become 
nothing  This is my ultimate victory  the destruction of reality it-
self.  
Yet since his first appearance in the series in Genesis of the Daleks 
(1975), Davros has stressed that his ambition, though uncompromising, is 
ultimately benevolent:  
When all other life forms are suppressed, when the Daleks are the 
supreme rulers of the universe, then you will have peace. Wars will 
end. They are the power not of evil but of good. 
Where I find my heaven 
Unlike Davros and the Master, the Doctor  the self-styled healer  
understands that the process of reaching a sustainable and sustaining 
peace is both time-consuming and traumatic. The possibility of a better fu-
ture does not (like a crusade or a jihad) involve the projection of an illusory 
past or the eradication of the historical present. In his twenty-first century 
incarnations, the Doctor no longer solves the problems of the universe so 
much as he allows those individuals he encounters to see that they hold 
the solutions within themselves. This pluralist approach eschews the inter-
ventionist polarizations which destroyed his civilization  and which, for that 
matter, may yet destroy our own. 
This is a critical and kinetic utopianism redolent of Tom Moylans 
model of a self-reflexive and deconstructive idealism,39 and one which 
also returns us to a Wellsian design: the Modern Utopia  must shape not 
as a permanent state but as a hopeful stage leading to a long ascent of 
stages.40 As envisaged in A Modern Utopia (1905), Wellss perfect world 
does not attempt to change the nature of man.41 In this respect, it differs 
fundamentally from the Utopia of the Cybermen, the Daleks or the Master  
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and, as Wells emphasises, from that of William Morris and other classical 
utopianists.42 Wells argues that the Morean or Platonic imposition upon in-
dividuals of a totalizing schematization  what George Orwell characterises 
as the wish to freeze history43  creates an unsustainably monologistic 
realm. Wellss Utopia does not negate the past, it embraces and consoli-
dates the dialectical process: Utopia too must have a history.44 Like the 
Doctor and Derrida, Wells promotes the prospect of a flexible common 
compromise.45 He specifically offers his Utopia as an effectual conclu-
sion to the controversies between leftism and individualism46  to the likes 
of Lenins insistence upon the antithesis  between liberalism and social-
ism.47 It may be that this reconciliatory pragmatism proves more effective 
than any amount of unbending idealism. 
What remains, then, is a Utopia, which is resolutely material, historical 
and dialogical, not the perfected state of fundamentalism, but the aspirant 
condition of a critical humanism. This Wellsian Utopia is not to be a 
unanimous world any more, it is to have all and more of the mental contra-
riety we find in the world of the real.48 Perhaps Samuel Butlers mock-
utopian vision was not so far off the mark after all. Butler wrote of his Ere-
whonians that when they profess themselves to be quite certain about any 
matter, and avow it as a base on which they are to build a system of prac-
tice, they seldom quite believe in it.49 It may be that this is the most sus-
tainably utopian (or heterotopian) perspective of all. 
In approaching the possibility of this heteroglossic utopianism, it 
seems pertinent to invoke the dialogical paradigms of Mikhail Bakhtin. Bak-
htin proposes the potential suspension of diametrically opposite positions 
within the notion of an active-dialogic understanding  the possibility of an 
infinite and unfinalized dialogue in which no meaning dies.50 Bakhtins 
dialogical imaginary is at once anachronistic and profoundly historical: it 
transcends individual contemporaneity to propose an interactive structura-
tion of histories and times. The architectonics, which mediates between the 
individual and the historical  this unity of answerability51  represents an 
organic, dynamic and discursive time machine. This process transforms the 
text into one capable of uncovering in each era and against ever new dia-
logizing backgrounds ever newer aspects of meaning; [its] semantic con-
tent literally continues to grow, to further create out of itself.52 Bakhtins 
dialogical model articulates a textual progressivism, which offers, in its de-
constructive negotiation of contraries, to regenerate the static pseudo-
utopianism of his own formalistic and totalitarian environment. 
Indeed, despite Wellss implications as to the totalizing nature of Tho-
mas Mores own Utopia, we may see hints of this self-deconstructive, criti-
cal utopianism in Mores original. Mores Utopia exposes the ambiguities 
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and impossibilities of its own idealizations. Its promised land is both a terra 
incognita and a terra nullius  a no-place of Ademus  Nopeople  and of 
Achoriorum populus, the people of Nolandia.53 Mores Utopia is hardly, in 
the popular and simplistic sense, utopian at all: it may be the prototype of 
Utopia, but it is hardly its stereotype.  
Fredric Jameson defines the meta-Utopian as including both the Uto-
pia and its generic adversary.54 Tom Moylan identifies within a comparable 
mode of self-critical utopian discourse, the potential for a process that 
can tear apart the dominant ideological web.55 One might enquire, in this 
context, whether Thomas Mores own apparent utopianism does not im-
manently resolve itself, or fail to resolve itself, into a similar set of practices. 
More himself challenges the condition of his Utopian citizens by announc-
ing the grand absurdity on which their whole society was based.56 Mores 
satire upon Utopia occupies precisely the same textual space (which is 
therefore a metatextual space, a paradoxical and impossible space, a no-
place), as does the satire upon his own socio-political reality, which that 
Utopia/Utopia represents. It is through this self-problematizing praxis (and 
its implicit and essential rejection of autarchy) that More offers the possibil-
ity of Moylans critical Utopia: a seditious expression of social change [] 
in a permanently open process of envisaging what is not yet.57
If the utopian impulse breaks down upon its contact with material his-
tory, then perhaps by inscribing  and, more importantly, integrating  its 
antithesis and its own absurdity within itself (as indeed, by the argument of 
its first part, Mores Utopia literally does), it might achieve a balance and a 
self-awareness sufficient to sustain it beyond the moment of its conception, 
the revolutionary or revelatory moment, and to translate its abstraction into 
the very physical placedness (the historical reality) which it had denied it-
self and which had threatened to extinguish it. It is only through dialogue 
with itself, its contraries and its contexts that the utopian impulse can hope 
to contextualise itself into existence. 
Bad omens 
Published four years before A Modern Utopia, H G Wellss Anticipations 
(1901) advances a much harsher perspective upon the future. Anticipations 
predicts that the end of the twentieth century would witness the rise of a 
naturally and informally organized, educated class  a New Republic 
dominating the world.58 Wellss New Republic is no frozen Utopia: its foun-
ders will not conceive of it as a millennial paradise, a blissful inconsequent 
stagnation, but as a world state of active  human beings.59 Yet this dy-
namic futurity seems starkly less heterogeneous than Wellss Modern Uto-
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pia: his New Republics approaches to the uneducable classes range from 
the eugenicist through to the genocidal: 
To make life convenient for the breeding of such people will seem  
an exceedingly abominable proceeding  [The New Republicans] 
will  where the whole tenor of a mans actions  seems to prove 
him unfitted for free life in the world  remove him from being  
[The New Republic] will tolerate no dark corners where the people of 
the Abyss may fester  those swarms of black, and brown, and 
dirty-white, and yellow people, who do not come into the new needs 
of efficiency  it is their portion to die out and disappear.60
These Anticipations in many ways anticipate the unsentimental vision of the 
process of the establishment of the hegemonic and homogeneous Modern 
State, which Wells presents in The Shape of Things to Come, portraying 
the apparent inevitability of the violent, uncompromising and totalizing im-
position of a perfected, absolutist state: the new government meant to rule 
not only the planet but the human will. One thing meant the other ... There 
was now to be one faith only in the world, the moral expression of the one 
world community.61 This pitilessly benevolent and oppressively puritani-
cal regime declares that the world is still full of misleading doctrines  
and it is the duty of government to erase these  We have to get a com-
mon vision of existence  established throughout the whole population of 
the world, and speedily.62 In todays terms, Wellss state seeks to win the 
hearts and minds of the people  through shock and awe. 
In Things to Come (1936), William Cameron Menziess less-than-
faithful film adaptation of Wellss text, a similar perspective is advanced by 
the new world orders dictator, a leader whose absolutist vision of a future 
of endless struggle allows no room for compromise: for Man no rest and 
no ending  he must go on  conquest beyond conquest  all the universe 
or nothingness. This ambition anticipates George W. Bushs uncompro-
mising proclamation of his own relentless crusade in his address to Con-
gress on 20 September 2001:  
Our war on terror  will not end until every terrorist group of global 
reach has been found, stopped and defeated  Every nation, in 
every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or 
you are with the terrorists. 
At once contradicting and reinforcing his own (already inherently absurd) 
message, the President added that this mission was a task that does not 
end. 
The Krillitane leader in Doctor Whos School Reunion (2006) repre-
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sents a remarkably similar mode of ludicrously benevolent tyranny  a 
transformative power that he offers to share with the Doctor: 
Reality becomes clay in our hands. We can shape the universe  
and improve it ... Think of the changes that could be made if this 
power was used for good  Become a god at my side. Think of the 
civilisations you could save  your own people  the Time Lords 
reborn. Imagine what you could do. 
The Krillitanes position draws upon a strand of uncompromising utopian-
ism, which leads from the Enlightenment into the French Revolution (from 
Rousseau to Robespierre) and towards the imposition of an intellectual 
elites social contract in the utopianism of modernity  the kind of industrial 
and technological societal construct foreseen by Wellss Anticipations and 
by his Modern Utopia. Postmodernism responds to this monological vision 
with its emphasis upon the possibilities of a pluralistic, dialogical mode of 
utopianism, one able to deconstruct its own totalizing trends. The absolutist 
grand narratives represented by such attempts to enforce new world orders 
as those of American neoconservatism or Islamic fundamentalism may be 
countered by the arguments in favour of dialogue, reconciliation and com-
promise attempted by figures as (fittingly) diverse as Mikhail Bakhtin, Jac-
ques Derrida, Russell T Davies and Barack Obama. The tensions between 
these polarizing and pluralist impulses not only represent (as Fredric 
Jameson and Tom Moylan demonstrate) a critical point within the history of 
utopian theory, they also articulate a crucial debate for our times. 
Conclusion 
At the end of The Shape of Things to Come, H G Wells proposes a 
model for utopian desire, which transcends William Morriss dichotomy be-
tween the fantastical dream and the prophetic vision: 
If this is neither a dream book nor a Sybilline history, then it is a the-
ory of world revolution. Plainly the thesis is that history must now 
continue to be a string of accidents with an increasingly disastrous 
trend until a comprehensive faith in the modernized World-State  
takes hold of the human imagination.63  
Wellss text has warned against an aggressive and proscriptive brand of 
utopianism: like Derrida, he argues instead in favour of a school of theory 
which narrates and elucidates historical processes, an ongoing and amelio-
rative dialogue between the contemporary situation and possibilities of futu-
rity. In an era of impetuous ideological polarisations, we might benefit from 
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this sense of radical patience. As the twenty-first century incarnation of 
Doctor Who also reminds us, the transformation of the universe can only be 
sustainable if it embraces difference and change. This is not a sudden, vio-
lent or totalizing mode of redemption: it is the slow yet eternally dynamic 
process of individual salvation and self-sacrifice. 
In his epilogue to The Time Machine (1895), however, Wells offers a 
starker view of humanitys prospects. He has already portrayed a world in 
which the class struggle has led to the evolution of a degenerate cannibal-
istic subspecies of homo sapiens. His Time Traveller journeys even further 
into the future, to the very end of the Earth, but finds nothing to counter this 
pessimistic perspective:  
He  thought but cheerlessly of the Advancement of Mankind, and 
saw in the growing pile of civilization only a foolish heaping that must 
inevitably fall back upon and destroy its creators in the end.64
Doctor Who to some extent maintains the chance of a future ripe with more 
positive possibilities. But it does so not by declaring the inevitability of a 
specific Utopia (as the Master, the Krillitanes, the Daleks, the Cybermen 
and Wellss Modern State and New Republic do), but, like A Modern Uto-
pia, precisely by delineating the impossibility and undesirability of a classi-
cally, stereotypically and homogeneously perfect state. 
The utopianist cannot after all enter her promised land. The attainment 
of perfection annihilates utopian desire  not because it satisfies that de-
sire, but because it cannot. Utopian citizens themselves  citizens of a fro-
zen, total Utopia  lack the utopian dynamic. They neither dream nor hope. 
Perhaps those who struggle towards that perfection have the better end of 
the deal. As Albert Camus suggests at the close of The Myth of Sisyphus, 
the struggle itself towards the heights is enough to fill a mans heart. We 
must imagine Sisyphus happy.65
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